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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

Research on recently adopted methods for teacher evaluation are
largely focused on issues of validity and pay less attention to the
consequences of implementation for the everyday practices of teaching and learning in schools. This paper draws on an ethnographic
case-study to argue that the joint tasks demanded by neoliberal
teacher evaluation policies structure interactions among teachers
and between teachers and administrators in ways that erode professional culture. Implications for policymakers, school leaders, and
teachers are considered.
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Introduction
Over the last ten years, there has been a marked attempt in the United States (US) to
expand teacher evaluation systems to more precisely measure teacher quality and to
provide information that drives improvement in teacher practice (Hallgren, JamesBurdumy, and Perez-Johnson 2014). These eﬀorts are backed by research that shows
the critical importance of teachers in student outcomes (Darling-Hammond 2000) and
reﬂect a shift in the approach to pursuing educational equity from desegregation to
improving school quality (Superﬁne 2013). Policy incentives, investments from private
foundations concerned with students’ access to eﬀective instruction, and the increased
availability of student performance data under federal accountability policies have
bolstered these eﬀorts and accelerated reforms to teacher evaluation. Following neoliberal, market-based policy trends in education since the 1990s, teacher evaluation, now
also referred to as teacher accountability, focuses on measuring and rating teacher
outcomes and impact (Amrein-Beardsley and Holloway 2017; Anderson and Cohen
2015; Ball 2016).
The reforms to teacher evaluation have been contentious. Some see the changes as
unreasonable and unfair, while others think they are necessary to mending a rubber-stamp
system of instructional oversight. The most controversial development has been the
introduction of value-added measures (VAMs), which link the change in student test scores
to teacher ratings. Scholars and teachers’ unions have raised concerns about the validity of
student growth measures for judging teacher quality, especially when used in high-stakes
contexts such as hiring-and-ﬁring decisions (AERA 2015). School districts employ a range
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of teacher evaluation tools to assess their instructional staﬀ, and VAMs are typically used in
combination with other measures, such as classroom observations and portfolios of lesson
plans and student work.
With most attention in the literature to the methodological problems that threaten
the reliability and validity of recently proposed and adopted teacher evaluation systems,
our understanding of the implementation and implications of teacher accountability
policies – how they are enacted by and shape the work of teachers and administrators –
has been limited. Evidence that intensiﬁed teacher evaluation systems do not fulﬁll their
intended outcomes of motivating instructional growth or dismissing weak educators
(Amrein-Beardsly and Holloway 2017) begs the question of what these policies are
doing instead. In this paper, I examine how teacher accountability policies impact
professional culture through a one-year ethnographic study at a US public middle
school. I draw upon organizational theory, policy enactment theory, and the sociology
of professions to demonstrate the ways that recent reforms to teacher accountability
color the relationships among teachers and between administrators and teachers.
I argue that the joint tasks set forth by neoliberal teacher evaluation policies produce
policy subjects (Ball et al. 2011) whose interactions are distanced and strained. Joint
tasks, as I employ the term here, are sites of coordination required by or in response to
policy mandates. They may be explicitly compelled by teacher evaluation policies (e.g.
post-observation conferences between administrators and teachers), or they may be
locally-forged, creative responses to policy directives (e.g. teachers must grade this
standardized test). The erosion of professional culture within the joint tasks entailed
by teacher accountability policies is concerning because of its implications for teacher
retention, teacher recruitment, student outcomes, and professional growth (Johnson
2015; Kraft and Papay 2014) – undermining the very outcomes that these policies
intend to support.
Producing policy subjects through joint tasks
Individuals relate to policies both as actors – those with agency in interpreting and implementing policy within their local context – and as policy subjects, individuals who embody
and embrace the systems of meaning and modes of action promoted by the policy (Ball et al.
2011; Braun, Maguire, and Ball 2010). Policy subjects tend to behave in ways that reﬂect and
rationalize the dominant institutional logic that motivates their policy environment (Ball et al.
2011; Holloway and Brass 2017; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). The accountability movement
in US education has promoted a neoliberal logic that constantly surveils and measures
teachers and has minimized a professional logic that respects educators’ expertise and
autonomy (Goodrick and Reay 2011). Recognizing that there is debate about the term and
how it is employed, I deﬁne neoliberalism in education as an institutional or policy logic that
champions free-market economic principles. Neoliberalism is not the absence of but rather
a particular form of governance that seeks to foster competition through ‘permanent
vigilance, activity, and intervention’ (Foucault 2008, 132). With time, policies under the
accountability regime have redeﬁned teachers and teaching, and administrators and leading,
to give rise to neoliberal subjects (Ball 2003). Institutional logics set ‘expectations for social
relations and behavior’ (Goodrick and Reay 2011, 375) and impact how individuals ‘organize
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality’ (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, 101).
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As Ball explains, policies work in ways that ‘do not just change what we do they also change
who we are, how we think about what we do, how we relate to one another. . .[they are] in our
heads and in our souls’ (2016, 1050). The logics behind policies shape how individuals think
about their social world and the possibilities to act within it, such as what constitutes
a problem and what solutions are deemed possible (Coburn 2004). Policy subjects are
produced by and reproduce policy logics.
In this paper, I focus on the production of policy subjects as the means through
which teacher accountability shapes professional culture within schools. One way
that policies produce subjects who act in ways complementary to their internal logics
is by structuring action and interaction. Although individuals have some agency as
policy actors, the range of possible actions available to them is limited. The notion
that teachers and administrators in schools have what Coburn calls ‘bounded autonomy’ (2004, 234) is derived from institutional theories that balance structural determinist and symbolic-interactionist perspectives (Thornton and Ocasio 2008).
Embedded agency (Thornton and Ocasio 2008) and inhabited institutionalism
(Hallet and Ventresca 2006) recognize that individuals have the freedom to act
and make meaning to the extent that the organizational, cultural, and material
tools available to them allow.
Policies structure action and interaction through day-to-day practices in schools:
[T]echnologies of reform typically do not confront us in the form of grand strategies but,
rather, as mundane and practical changes in our everyday practices. They are embedded in
new vocabularies of practice, new roles with new titles, and in grids, templates, mentoring
relationships, annual reviews, evaluations and output indicators. It is these very practical
and ordinary words and artefacts that present us with new ways of thinking about what we
do, about our colleagues, and about ourselves. (Ball 2016, 1050)

I examine how policies organize interaction through mundane joint tasks, or sites of
coordination required by or in response to policy mandates. In some cases, these joint
tasks are compelled by policy, such as the explicit requirement for administrators and
teachers to conference after a formal classroom observation. In other cases, while the
ends of the joint tasks are made clear by policy (e.g. administer the test, rate the
teacher), the means are not determined, and local actors must creatively forge collective
approaches to comply with policy directives. Interactions within joint tasks, whether
compelled or locally forged, are marked by institutional logics: ‘institutional logics
shape and create the rules of the game, the means-ends relationships by which power
and status are gained, maintained, and lost in organizations’ (Thornton and Ocasio
2008, 112). Because individual identities are created in part through interaction
(Rodgers and Scott 2008), these joint tasks remake teachers and administrators. By
drawing attention to the role of joint tasks in the production of policy subjects, I seek to
identify the sites of subjectiﬁcation under neoliberal evaluation policies where teachers
and administrators are disciplined into particular ways of interacting.

The rise of teacher accountability
Reforms to closely monitor and ensure teacher quality have spread across the globe
with countries’ eﬀorts to train a workforce competitive in the worldwide marketplace
(Tatto 2006) and with the dissemination of the technologies of ‘new public
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management’ by international organizations (e.g. OECD) and policy entrepreneurs
(Ball 2016; Echávarri and Peraza 2017; Flores and Derrington 2017; Tatto 2006;
Verger and Curran 2014). Although there has been a general convergence around
teacher evaluation policy internationally, individual countries have taken up the
reforms in diﬀerent ways and to diﬀerent extents. Local conceptions of what constitutes
a good teacher and good teaching, the strength and role of teachers’ unions, policymakers’ orientations to business and management, the extent of private-public partnerships, and/or the presence of established national or regional standardized tests that
allow for comparison shape the variation in how countries have adopted international
trends in teacher evaluation (Avalos-Bevan 2018; Echávarri and Peraza 2017; Englund
and Frostenson 2017; Flores 2018; Klenowski 2012; La Londe 2017; Straubhaar 2017;
Tatto 2006; Verger and Curran 2014). The attention to teacher accountability has
brought about a range of practices (e.g. professional teaching standards, performancebased pay) and has led to greater centralization in some countries and decentralization
in others (Tatto 2006).
Reﬂecting global patterns, the last ten years have seen an expansion and intensiﬁcation of teacher evaluation policies in the US. Rubrics have been introduced or revised to
precisely deﬁne eﬀective instruction and to rate teachers on multiple components of
their practice. Value-added measures (VAMs) link students’ growth on performance
measures, such as standardized tests, to teacher eﬀectiveness ratings. These reforms,
which attempt to more precisely measure teacher quality, were spearheaded by the
Obama administration, whose Race to the Top (RttT) initiative was the ﬁrst major
federal eﬀort in the US to standardize teacher evaluation policies that have historically
varied widely across states and districts. RttT oﬀered ﬁnancial incentives to incorporate
student growth measures into teacher ratings. In addition, No Child Left Behind
(NCLB) waivers granted under Obama also required states to strengthen their teacher
accountability policies. These centralized initiatives were inspired and bolstered by
several trends in education: the rising inﬂuence of econometric research in education
that spoke to teachers’ impact on students’ academic achievement and future earnings
(e.g. Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoﬀ 2011; Hanushek 2011); an accountability policy
paradigm in which eﬀectiveness in all realms of education is measured by student
outcomes on standardized tests (Murphy, Hallinger, and Heck 2013); the increased
availability of student performance data; and advocacy groups and foundations concerned with the quality of US teachers (Amrein-Beardsley and Holloway 2017).
Most of the research on recent reforms to teacher evaluation has concentrated on the
reliability and validity of detailed observation rubrics and VAMs. As the rise of VAMs
is due to the increased inﬂuence of economists in education (Amrein-Beardsley and
Holloway 2017), scholarship has responded in a similar language, focused on the
technical, methodological core of the policies. Although VAMs are recognized as an
improvement over status models that evaluate teachers according to their students’
performance in relation to an established threshold (AERA 2015), the list of concerns
about the validity of VAMs is extensive. The arrray of critiques launched against VAMs
include concerns about missing data; isolating the eﬀects of a single teacher; excluding
peer eﬀects, school composition, and student attitudes toward the test; separating
school and teacher eﬀects; small sample sizes; bias against teachers with extremely
low- and extremely high- performing students who show little growth on grade-level

JOURNAL OF EDUCATION POLICY

627

tests; and using only one test to assess student knowledge (AERA 2015; Berliner 2013;
Betebenner et al. 2012). Moreover, several scholars have found teacher ratings to be
unstable from one VAM formula to another, one year to the next, or when switching
grades or subjects, suggesting that VAMs are not a reliable gauge of instructional
eﬀectiveness (Berliner 2013; Betebenner et al. 2012). For all of these reasons, many
have warned that VAMs lead to misinterpretation and misclassiﬁcation and are nearly
impossible to implement fairly with reliability and validity (AERA 2015; AmreinBeardsley and Holloway 2017; Berliner 2013; Betebenner et al. 2012). Despite the
laundry-list of concerns that educational researchers bring to the table, teacher ratings,
like many neoliberal reforms that rely on highly technical measures of eﬃciency and
eﬀectiveness, emit an illusion of certainty, objectivity, and comprehensiveness that is
perceived as legitimate (Schwarz 2015).
Recently, some scholars have called for research that looks beyond the technical
issues of newly adopted strategies to measure and rate teachers toward the implementation of these policies and the unintended consequences of putting them to practice
(Braun 2015; Hewitt 2015; Holloway-Libell and Collins 2014; Johnson 2015; Murphy,
Hallinger, and Heck 2013; Riordan et al. 2015). As these reforms fall short of their
intended outcomes (e.g. raising student achievement), the unintended outcomes are
particularly important to consider (Johnson 2015; Murphy, Hallinger, and Heck 2013).
According to Murphy, Hallinger, and Heck (2013), since the direct relationship
between teacher evaluation and student achievement is questionable, we need to
examine possible indirect relationships, including the role of professional culture in
mediating policy’s impact on student learning.
Professional culture is the slice of school culture pertaining to teachers and administrators. Building on Cohen et al.’s deﬁnition of school culture, I deﬁne professional culture
as ‘patterns of [administrators’ and teachers’] experiences of school life [that reﬂect] norms,
goals, values, interpersonal relationships, teaching and learning practices, and organizational structures’ (2009, 182). A school’s professional culture is not simply a microcosm of
the larger societal culture or a mirror image of the professional culture in other organizations and ﬁelds (e.g. business, ﬁnance) (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984). Nonetheless, it is
signiﬁcantly shaped by the school’s environment, including the policy context (Allaire
and Firsirotu 1984; Cohen et al. 2009). Professional culture has been operationalized in
previous research as a composite of several factors, including faith in leadership, peer
collaboration, support for professional development, feelings of safety, trust in colleagues,
and teacher voice (Kraft and Papay 2014; Riordan et al. 2015). Teacher-to-teacher and
administrator-to-teacher relationships, which I examine in this paper, are the site for
several of these components (e.g. trust, peer collaboration, leadership) (Cohen et al. 2009).
A positive professional culture is foundational for eﬀective schooling. It is correlated
to teacher retention, professional growth, and student achievement, all central goals of
recent reforms to teacher evaluation (Cohen et al. 2009; Stoll et al. 2006). Kraft and
Papay found that ‘teachers in schools with stronger professional environments experience greater returns to experience over time’ (2014, 489). As opposed to teacher
evaluation systems that understand instructional quality as ﬁxed and internal to individual educators, research shows that teacher development is a collaborative process. In
schools with strong peer networks and administrative support, teachers improve, while
teacher growth is stunted in schools with a poor professional environment (Johnson
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2015). A supportive professional culture can maximize and magnify a teacher’s abilities:
‘the school organization becomes greater than the sum of its parts, and in this way, the
social capital that transforms human capital through collegial activities in schools
increases the school’s overall instructional capacity and, arguably, its success’
(Johnson 2015, 119). Serving as the foundation for social capital, staﬀ relationships
have a signiﬁcant impact on professional improvement and student achievement.
Teacher accountability in practice: the impact on professional culture
The sociology of professions, which examines how professions, professionals, professionalism, and professionalization are shaped by their historical, social, political, and economic
contexts, suggests how neoliberal education policy may impact professional culture in
schools. Looking across several ﬁelds of work, Evetts proposes that market-driven reforms
have brought about what she refers to as a new-professionalism characterized by ‘increasing
levels of managerialism, bureaucracy, standardization, assessment and performance reviews’
(2011, 407). New-professionalism allows practitioners little control over their work as the
‘managerial demands for quality control and audit, target setting and performance review
become reinterpreted as the promotion of professionalism’ (Evetts 2011, 412). Practitioners
have seen a loss of discretion and an increase in oversight of their performance based on
individual output aligned to organizational goals (e.g. number of clients visited, number of
traﬃc tickets distributed). They are no longer trusted to exercise professional judgment
independently and are subjected to constant surveillance, shifting the relationship between
supervisor and employee: ‘the traditional relationship of employer–professional trust is
changed to one necessitating supervision, assessment and audit’ (Evetts 2011, 416).
Contracts replace professional commitment and competence as the mechanism to ensure
work quality: ‘sociality and social relations are replaced by informational structures. We all
know and value others by their outputs rather than by their individuality and humanity’ (Ball
2016, 1054). Supervisors take on the role of interpreting policy and insist on consensus
around their interpretation, leaving little autonomy to their employees (Ball et al. 2011).
These changes in the ‘ways and means of organizing work and workers’ (Evetts 2011, 409)
have facilitated individualization in the workplace, encouraged competition, and discouraged
collaboration and collegiality.
Applying Evetts’ concept of new-professionalism to the ﬁeld of education, Anderson
and Cohen (2015) explain how the expansion of market-based reforms – such as school
choice, increased reliance on test scores, data-driven management, and expanded
teacher evaluation systems – have produced new teacher identities. Neoliberal policies
inﬂuence the behavior of teachers from the outside by, for instance, increasing the
number of tests that teachers must prepare their students for, but also from the inside,
normalizing market-based logics in the ways that teachers and administrators reason
about and address daily decisions. Reduced to their student achievement scores and
under the constant surveillance of measurement, teachers expend signiﬁcant energy on
‘impression management’ (Anderson and Cohen 2015, 13). Under pressure to attain
particular performance targets, teachers focus on compliance rather than on professional learning and growth (Ball et al. 2011). Teachers experience anxiety and may lose
motivation in their careers, as developing meaningful connections with students,
parents, and colleagues with similar commitments is trivialized in comparison to
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more easily measurable aspects of their job. Buchanan explains the misalignment of
teacher accountability to teacher motivation: ‘The current reform context overemphasizes the technical and rational components of the profession, and devalues the emotional, personal, and relational aspects of teaching, which is at the core of many
teachers’ commitments’ (2015, 703). By changing what it means to be a good teacher,
neoliberal education policies attempt to mold teachers into subjects who interact in
ways that support and reproduce their market-based logics.
The literature proposes a few ways in which teacher evaluation has impacted
professional culture or, more speciﬁcally, professional relationships within schools.
All the studies reviewed in this section foresee that recent reforms to teacher evaluation
will negatively impact professional culture, speciﬁcally by decreasing collaboration and
increasing anxiety and litigiousness.
Increased individualism and decreased collaboration
Several scholars suggest that reforms that aim to more precisely measure teacher quality
will lead to increased competition and individualism (Ball 2003; Collins 2014; Flores and
Derrington 2017; Hewitt 2015; Johnson 2015; Sachs 2001). Some trace this change back to
the comparative design of teacher rubrics and student growth measures, which are intended
to diﬀerentiate teachers rather than reﬂect their eﬀectiveness (Amrein-Beardsley and
Holloway 2017; Hewitt 2015). VAMs may incentivize competition between teachers,
especially when ﬁnancial bonuses are oﬀered to teachers whose students show the most
growth (Collins 2014). Teachers are discouraged from sharing expertise and successful
strategies and from providing each other with constructive feedback. Teachers are encouraged to take sole ownership over their own students rather than to feel accountable to the
entire student body at their school (Johnson 2015). By enhancing the traditional egg-crate
culture of schools in which teachers operate independently in their classrooms, neoliberal
teacher evaluation policies may undermine student growth and professional development,
both of which rely on teacher collaboration (Johnson 2015).
Increased anxiety and decreased morale
Teachers may feel increased anxiety about their evaluations as the formulas for teacher
ratings are made more complex. They ﬁnd themselves stuck between the pressure to
achieve high ratings and the diﬃculty to understand how their scores are calculated, feeling
fearful and a loss of control over their career (Balch and Koedel 2014; Collins 2014; Conley
and Glasman 2008; Flores and Derrington 2017; Leonardatos and Zahedi 2014). Teachers
have several concerns about how VAMs are determined, such as how their ratings are
impacted by student attendance, school closings, and working with students with disabilities or low-income students (Balch and Koedel 2014). They are increasingly insecure and
lose conﬁdence in their practice as they feel constantly surveilled and measured (Ball 2003;
Leonardatos and Zahedi 2014). Anxiety can foster teacher practices that undermine student
learning, such as gaming the test, cheating, and focusing on the students who are most
likely to improve (Conley and Glasman 2008). On the other hand, proactive eﬀorts by states
to deter these practices, such as New York’s extensive spending on test security and the
requirement that teachers do not score their own students, communicates policymakers’
distrust in teachers and further lowers morale (Leonardatos and Zahedi 2014). Reinforced
by public opinion and media coverage that denigrate educators, reforms to teacher
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evaluation may lead teachers to leave the profession or retire early at higher rates rather
than put up with the stress of having their practice constantly measured and assessed
(Hewitt 2015; Leonardatos and Zahedi 2014).
Increased litigiousness
Some legal and education scholars have forecasted an increase in lawsuits ﬁled by
teachers and teacher unions or by families and community advocates. The lack of
transparency and the questionable methodologies of student growth measures open
school districts up to being sued by teachers and teacher unions (Baker, Oluwole, and
Green 2013; Holloway-Libell and Collins 2014). Teachers may challenge their dismissal
on several legal bases, considering the problems with VAMs’ reliability and validity:
Overly prescriptive, rigid teacher evaluation mandates, in our view, are likely to open the
ﬂoodgates to new litigation over teacher due process rights. . .despite the fact that much of
the policy impetus behind these new evaluation systems is the reduction of legal hassles
involved in terminating ineﬀective teachers. (Baker, Oluwole, and Green 2013, 18–19)

Sawchuk (2015) documents many such suits brought by teacher unions to federal and
state courts, based on a range of complaints, including lack of clarity in or ﬁdelity to
policy and lack of validity and reliability in the formulas utilized. In addition to legal
actions initiated by employees, teachers, schools, and school districts may be charged
with educational malpractice now that incompetent and inadequate instruction is
allegedly possible to precisely and objectively identify: ‘A new public policy favoring
accountability and the advent of a statistical model that purports to identify ineﬀective –
possibly incompetent – instruction may combine to build a path to recognizing educational malpractice as a viable remedy for students who allegedly suﬀered an academic
injury’ (DeMitchell, DeMitchell, and Gagnon 2012, 259). DeMitchell, DeMitchell, and
Gagnon (2012) worry that increased litigiousness could encourage teachers to adopt
practices that ensure higher ratings but do not support student learning, such as gaming
or teaching to the test.
Limitations of the literature
Our understanding of the impact of teacher accountability on professional culture has
been limited by the range of methodologies used. Some of the studies build on theory,
law, and the logic of neoliberal policies to forecast how teacher accountability may
impact professional culture (e.g. Anderson and Cohen 2015; Baker, Oluwole, and Green
2013; Braun 2015; DeMitchell, DeMitchell, and Gagnon 2012). Other studies are
empirically based but rely on interviews and surveys that elicit teacher and administrator perceptions of new evaluation policies and how they aﬀect professional interactions (e.g. Collins 2014; Hewitt 2015; Reddy et al. 2018). While these studies oﬀer
important understandings of the perceived validity of teacher accountability, they are
vulnerable to social desirability and cannot be understood as direct reﬂections of
behavior within schools. None of these studies include observations within schools
that substantiate or disconﬁrm theoretically-based projections or practitioners’ selfreport. Moreover, few studies go beyond issues of policy design to trace the implementation of teacher accountability. I examine the joint tasks entailed by teacher accountability in action. Relying largely on ethnographic observations, I oﬀer data to probe
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theoretical projections and self-report-based claims. The focus on ‘joint tasks’ bridges
the bodies of literature reviewed above by illuminating one mechanism through which
neoliberal policy logics construct teacher subjectivities and, thereby, shape professional
culture. I document how policy subjects are created intersubjectively, through the
interactions entailed by teacher evaluation. While studies based on surveys and interviews have been largely focused on teacher-teacher relationships alone, I also consider
administrator-teacher relationships.

Methodology
Data collection
This paper is derived from a one-year ethnography of Germaine Middle School (GMS),
a racially and economically segregated public middle school located in a large urban
district in the US. GMS was selected for its diverse, high-needs student body, whose
academic achievement is more reliant upon teacher quality than student populations of
higher socio-economic status (Berliner 2006; Kainz and Pan 2014; Owens, Reardon, and
Jencks 2016). Asian, Black, and Latinx students each constituted more than 20% but less
than 50% of the student body. Approximately 15% of students were classiﬁed as English
learners (ELs) and 15% as students with disabilities (SWDs), and the entire student
body qualiﬁed for free lunch.
An ethnographic approach allowed me to capture how the day-to-day enactment of
accountability policy was embedded in the local organizational and social context (Ball
et al. 2011; Coburn 2005, 2006; Spillane 2006). I conducted over 600 hours of participant observation and 73 semi-structured interviews with teachers, school staﬀ members, school and district administrators, parents, and students during the 2014–2015
academic year. I interviewed every school administrator and ﬁfty-three teachers, which
represented more than 85% of the instructional staﬀ at GMS.
This paper draws heavily from my observations of more than 100 staﬀ meetings,
including departmental meetings, whole staﬀ meetings, committee meetings, and
administrative meetings, and more than 80 lessons across all content areas and grade
levels. I collected documents used by participants at staﬀ meetings, such as tables
presenting student performance data and district guidelines for grading exams. As
tools that in part structured interactions, these documents assisted in creating
a holistic record of joint tasks. On days when I trailed school leaders through their
regular routines, I witnessed formal tasks required by teacher evaluation policy, such as
administrators’ observations of teachers in classrooms and pre- and post- observation
meetings between administrators and teachers.
Data analysis
With the use of the qualitative analysis program MAXQDA, I initially analyzed
observation ﬁeldnotes and interview transcripts by open coding, producing an extensive
set of emergent themes (Glaser and Strauss 1967). During this ﬁrst round of analysis,
I also assigned descriptive codes that indicated, for instance, the grade level, content
area, month, category of actor (e.g. student, teacher, parent, administrator), to the
excerpted sections of data. These descriptive codes allowed me to analyze how ﬁndings
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varied across organizational structures, actors, social groups, locations, and time. After
the ﬁrst round of analysis was complete, I consolidated, hierarchized, and precisely
deﬁned the inductively-derived themes to create a codebook that was then used to
recode the entire data set (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014).
The data captured by the codes ‘teacher evaluation,’ ‘mandates to teachers from the
school or district,’ and ‘value-added measures’ were central to my analysis, and, when
I found professional relationships to be signiﬁcant across these themes, I broadened my
analysis to include codes that indicated relational aspects of teacher evaluation, such as
‘school culture,’ ‘perceptions of teachers and teaching,’ ‘perceptions of administrators
and educational leadership,’ and ‘teacher resistance.’

Findings
At the time of my study, GMS’s teachers were evaluated by 1) classroom observations
conducted by school administrators and guided by a detailed rubric and by 2) a valueadded measure that averaged student growth on two standardized tests – one designed
by the state and one provided by the district. The state test had been previously
administered for measuring student achievement and making student promotion decisions, and it had only recently been integrated into educators’ evaluations. The inclusion of the district test was an optional addition to the state test, and the teachers at
GMS had consistently voted to include it in their VAM. The state test was administered
once a year in the Spring, while the district test consisted of a pre-test in the Fall and
a post-test in the Spring. The results of district test did not have consequences for the
students, only for the teachers’ VAMs.
Although teacher accountability promotes an individualized logic in which
teachers are held accountable for their own performance and those of their
students alone, several of the steps needed to fulﬁll the policy demands and to
produce a teacher’s rating were collective. The teacher evaluation system required
the staﬀ at GMS to carry-out multiple joint tasks compelled by or in response to
policy mandates. Below, I highlight several of these joint tasks and provide
evidence to show how they structured relationships in ways that eroded the
professional culture at GMS. Professional interactions both directly and indirectly
related to assessing instructional quality were strained by neoliberal teacher evaluation policy. Feelings of anxiety and vulnerability marked teachers’ interactions
with each other, while administrator-teacher interactions were distanced, juridical,
and technical. I distinguish between the character of administrator-teacher and
teacher-teacher relationships because teacher evaluation policies work diﬀerently
upon school actors depending on their location in the institution; they delineate
the roles of administrators and teachers and infuse a power diﬀerential between
the two. Moreover, teacher evaluation policy demands diﬀerent joint tasks be
carried out by teachers and administrations (e.g. formal observations, feedback
conferences) and among teachers (e.g. establishing norms to grade the tests,
grading each other’s students), establishing distinct contexts that structure
interactions.
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Teacher-teacher relationships
Teachers at GMS had to work together to accomplish several steps required by the
teacher evaluation system. Many practices, such as proctoring and grading the tests of
other teachers’ students, made teachers more reliant upon each other. In some cases,
interdependence was explicit, such as when two diﬀerent teachers relied on the same
test scores from the same students for their student growth measures. The joint tasks of
evaluation were sites that fostered anxiety, distrust, horizontal surveillance, and vulnerability in teachers’ relationships. As teachers were enlisted in the process of measuring
their peers, they became sources of ‘uncertainty and instability’ (Ball 2003, 220) for each
other. Below I present three joint tasks required by student growth measures, from
classroom instruction to the administration and grading of exams, that strained teacher
relationships.
Sharing students, sharing student test scores
In cases where there was no standardized test oﬀered in a teacher’s content area or
when core subject and intervention teachers worked with the same students, the same
student test scores factored into the student growth measure of multiple teachers’
ratings. For teachers, this meant that the measure of their professional quality was
subject to the instructional practices of their colleagues. Such interdependence required
the trust that one’s colleagues were committed and eﬀective educators, or at least
preparing their students well for the tests. Teachers expressed feelings of vulnerability,
anxiety, and injustice about their reliance on colleagues, which was reiﬁed and made
high-stakes by evaluation policy.
Teachers outside of the four primary content areas (math, English language arts,
science, and social studies) were particularly vulnerable to the performance of their
colleagues’ students. Elective teachers (e.g. gym, music, art) were completely dependent on their colleagues in other content areas when it came to the student growth
aspect of their rating. For example, the gym teachers were evaluated using the
English language arts (ELA) and math scores of the students in their classes. This
disconnect between what a teacher taught and the assessment used in their evaluation was perceived as unfair across the entire staﬀ. One assistant principal critiqued
the state’s suggestion to increase the percentage of a rating reliant on student
growth measures because of this misalignment. In an interview, he rhetorically
asked, ‘you think that’s fair. . .[that] the gym teacher’s rating is dependent on how
the ELA teachers and the math teachers teach?’ The district had sought to minimize
this misalignment by introducing assessments in more subject areas than math and
ELA in recent years. These eﬀorts only addressed social studies and science teachers,
and they increased the number of standardized tests for students and the time spent
on grading summative assessments that do not inform instruction for teachers.
Improving the validity of teacher ratings came at the expense of the expansion of
testing, which past research has repeatedly shown is detrimental to student learning
by, for example, narrowing the curriculum (Jennings and Bearak 2014). Here is one
instance in which it becomes clear that eﬀorts to attend to the validity of current
methods, speciﬁcally VAMs, are insuﬃcient because they neglect the consequences
for the everyday work of teaching and learning in schools.
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Although less dependent on their colleagues’ practice than elective teachers, core
subject and intervention teachers who shared the same students were assessed according to the same student test scores, even though they did not have full control of the
students’ learning in their content area. GMS pulled many students out of their classes
for a range of intervention programs or services. Some of these sessions were initiated
by teacher referrals or justiﬁed by student test scores the previous year, and others were
mandated by SWDs’ Individualized Education Programs (IEPs). GMS sought to schedule supplementary supports, such as speech therapy and ELA and math intervention,
during elective periods so that students did not miss their core classes. Teachers who
provided math or ELA intervention services for students one or two periods a week and
the ELA and math core teachers relied on each other to support students concurrently.
One intervention teacher explained: ‘I’m depending a lot on the other teachers to also
hopefully get those kids moved up. . .if the core teachers aren’t making that move for me
and I’m not helping them make that move then I’m kind of screwed a little.’ The two
teachers’ fates were tied together, which had the potential to promote collaboration
between the core and intervention teachers, although in the absence of allotted time and
resources for discussing students and sharing strategies, I observed no formal collaboration and limited informal communication between core and intervention teachers over
the year.
Core subject teachers in inclusive classrooms and special education teachers who
pulled students out for some or all of the minutes allocated to math or ELA were
similarly dependent upon the same student tests scores. GMS sought to integrate SWDs
as much as possible in inclusive or general education classrooms (in the ‘least restrictive
environment’). SWDs whose IEPs recommended smaller instructional settings were
placed in inclusive, team-taught homerooms and accommodated with pull-out sessions
for part or all of their math and ELA instruction. This design meant that a teacher may
only instruct a student in ELA a third of the time and be reliant on another teacher to
provide quality instruction for the remaining periods dedicated to the same subject. In
reviewing her students' data at a faculty meeting, one math teacher worried aloud that
her performance was being evaluated in part by the performance of students who were
pulled out for part or all of their math instruction. A district special education administrator who worked with GMS explained how student growth measures heighten the
need for trust among teachers:
If I’m going to be rated on the success or outcomes of a test for my children, I solely
would like to know that I know every in and out about that child. If I take that
professional onus, I have to trust my colleague has that same professional culture that
I have. I trust you that if I send my kid there for 30 minutes, they’re going to work as
hard as I am working with your kids for 30 minutes. That’s the breakthrough. Teachers
don’t have that trust.

Distrust and feelings of unfairness emerged from the way that the evaluation system
made teachers interdependent.
Proctoring tests for other teachers’ students
According to test guidance, teachers were not allowed to proctor the test for their own
students. They were reliant on their colleagues to administer the test. In the preparation
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for administering the state standardized tests, I observed the staﬀ express anxiety about
their interdependence and pressure each other to conform to testing regulations.
A math teacher who also served as GMS’s test coordinator spent weeks preparing for
the multiple exams that needed to be administered in the Spring. He worked with
attention to detail to ensure that he managed the tests according to regulation.
Reﬂecting on the gravity of his responsibilities, he explained: ‘I don’t want to mess
up because it’s [the teachers’] ratings.’ At one staﬀ meeting, he insisted that teachers
proctor the tests with an appreciation for the impact on their colleague’s ratings: ‘there
is no texting, no cell phones. . .no iPads. . .you can’t just sit down. . .this is another
teacher’s rating.’ The next day, the test coordinator explained to me why he had been
so forceful with his colleagues:
It aﬀects my rating, it is not fair if another teacher does not actively proctor while my kids
take the test. You can say to the whole class, “pay attention,” “make sure you stay on task,”
“make sure you answer all of the questions,” “don’t leave any blank.” You can tell
a sleeping student to wake up but you cannot say anything speciﬁc about the question
they are on. You have to walk around for an hour and a half.

In order to meet this teacher’s expectations for being an accountable colleague, teachers had
to actively monitor the class, encouraging students to complete the test to the best of their
ability without providing direct assistance, which would qualify as cheating. During the
district assessments a few months later, which also factored into teachers’ student growth
measures, the test coordinator was similarly emphatic that his colleagues proctor with
vigilance, even though the oﬃcial guidelines were more lenient than with the state exam,
such as allowing teachers to spread the test over two days if necessary. He insisted in a staﬀ
meeting that the teachers understood how the extent to which they encouraged students to
remain attentive could have serious consequences for their colleagues. Despite the actual
variability in teacher ratings because of proctoring practices, the test coordinator encouraged teachers to feel vulnerable to each other, to worry that others might not act in their
beneﬁt. Proctoring for colleagues strained professional relationships not only by introducing anxiety and suspicion, but also by encouraging teachers to forcefully pressure each
other to behave in ways that maximized student scores.
Although I was unable to observe teachers proctoring during standardized exams,
I witnessed GMS pilot student surveys for the district, which was exploring the
possibility of incorporating student opinions into teacher ratings. Like the tests, these
surveys had to be administered by a colleague of the teacher being evaluated. In one
classroom, the students struggled to comprehend, or even in some cases to read, the
questions. In response, the teacher paraphrased each question in her own words for the
class, allowing them to complete the survey while also shaping student understandings
and, thereby, responses. Despite her eﬀorts to keep the students engaged, the teacher
struggled to manage student behavior. Many of the students were wandering around
the classroom. Some explicitly refused to complete the survey, and others expressed that
it was boring. This observation suggests that concerns about variability in how teachers
administered assessments for teacher evaluation may have been warranted.
Grading other teachers’ students
Teachers spent a majority of their weekly allotted collaborative time preparing for,
norming, and grading tests in the Spring. As mentioned above, the guidelines for the
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administration of the district tests were more relaxed than the strict regulations for the
state exams, which were graded externally. Teachers could grade their students’ district
pre-tests in the Fall, however the post-test had to be graded by a colleague. Teachers
relied on their colleagues to grade fairly and according to how each department had
normed with the rubric provided by the district.
The teacher leaders were put in charge of norming the test with their departments
and overseeing grading sessions. One teacher drew attention to how both quality of
instruction and grading practices aﬀected scores as she prepped the ELA department for
marking the post-test: ‘there is no teacher who got less than eﬀective last year. . .no
teacher that this was a negative thing for them. . .part of it is that we do a good job
[teaching] during the year. . .[and it] could be we score ourselves low in the fall and our
buddies score us better [in the Spring].’ There were grave concerns in the ELA
department about including some teachers in the grading. The year before my study,
two teachers in the ELA department were excluded from grading because they were not
trusted to grade fairly. An ELA teacher explained her anxieties about one of the
teachers: ‘she is disgruntled. . .she scores harshly. . .she gives someone who should
have gotten a 3 a 1.’ Scoring one’s colleagues as leniently as the rubric allowed was
understood to be the appropriate approach and was necessary to being perceived as
a good colleague. The administration allowed the teacher to grade the year of my study,
but her colleagues were vigilant to put structures in place to intercept any grading issues
that may arise with her or others. One ELA instructional leader explained that she
would work with two other teachers to double-check how their colleagues scored the
post-test: ‘[Three of us] are going to serve as back-scorers. . .I’m going to be very strict
with this stuﬀ. . .I’m going to say this is really serious stuﬀ.’ The ELA department leaders
intentionally heightened the pressure on and surveillance of teachers during their
collaborative time when they normed and graded the assessments so as to communicate
the importance of the task. ‘[It] has to be a big formal thing. . .it has to be a really formal
process, because these are people’s ratings,’ one teacher lectured her colleagues in
a department meeting.
My observation of grading sessions not only revealed horizontal surveillance, but
also vulnerability as teachers examined the performance of their colleagues’ students. Teachers’ discomfort and nervousness at the transparency required by grading manifested itself as a combination of self-deprecating humor and setting low
expectations at grading sessions. In the social studies meeting, one teacher explained
apologetically to her colleague: ‘for my class you are not going to have all 3s and
4s. . .it will be mostly 2s and 3s.’ At the math meeting, one teacher apologized to
a department leader, ‘I’m sorry if I make you look bad.’ In response, the department
leader teased the teacher, who was known as a strong instructor and had been asked
to facilitate professional development sessions for his colleagues: ‘I’ll have to put you
on my list, I’ll be in your room every week next year [to observe you].’ ‘[My
students] don’t remember anything about math, I am a horrible teacher,’ the teacher
lamented. The math teachers’ playful banter sought to lessen any embarrassment or
disappointment that might come from their colleagues seeing their students perform
poorly. Moreover, grading other teachers’ tests facilitated comparison and constructed teachers’ reputations as weak or strong educators, making grading sessions
a high-stakes site where collegial respect could be lost or gained.
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Administrator-teacher relationships
Teacher accountability policies introduced policy artifacts into GMS that administrators
and teachers had to negotiate or employ together in the evaluation process. In this
section, I discuss joint tasks entailed by two artifacts: 1) the teachers’ contract that
outlined the components of the evaluation system and each party’s rights in the process
and 2) the rubric that set forth a standardized deﬁnition of eﬀective teacher practice.
Teachers and administrators had to organize their behavior so that they fulﬁlled but did
not overstep the agreements stipulated in the contract, and they had to employ the
rubric to assess instructional practice. Both of these joint tasks negatively impacted the
administrator-teacher relationship, making it juridical, technical and distant.
Upholding but not overstepping the contract
The teachers’ contract with the district ﬁxed the terms of the evaluation system. It set
guidelines for the frequency of observations, what should be accomplished at each stage
of the evaluative process, and the responsibilities and rights of each party involved. The
contract was a live document in GMS. Administrators and teachers made reference to it
in order to deﬁne and compel appropriate professional behavior in ways that made
administrator-teacher relationships at GMS juridical and technical.
The contract in place at the time of my study had only recently gone into eﬀect. The
district had been delayed in receiving the state’s RttT funds because it had previously
failed to reach an agreement with the teachers’ and administrators’ unions. Out of
contract, the evaluations had been inadmissible and carried no consequence. The legal
agreement ﬁnally reached represented the outcome of a contentious process in which
each stakeholder had jockeyed to advance their own interests. According to one
assistant principal at GMS, the teachers’ union had leveraged the pressure the state
was under to implement reforms required by RttT to secure more favorable conditions.
Administrators succeeded in simplifying their responsibilities, which reduced their
workload; they no longer needed to provide artifacts, such as lesson plans, with their
observation write-up’s, and the rubric used to assess teacher practice was downsized by
the elimination of some categories. I learned details about the negotiation process from
administrators and teachers as they worked out the appropriate norms of interaction
with each other, suggesting that the agonistic foundation of the contract continued to
imbue professional relationships at GMS.
Despite their actual knowledge of the agreement’s terms, administrators and teachers
frequently made reference to ‘the contract’ in making sense of their professional
responsibilities, rights, and expectations of each other. The administration was careful
to act in accordance with the contract to avoid the risk of a teacher ﬁling a grievance.
Administrators debated what they were allowed and not allowed to demand from
teachers. ‘Can we collect lesson plans?’ one assistant principal asked, and another
replied, ‘yes, but you have to give it back the same day, their plans are their property.’
The principal and assistant principals were wary of oﬃcially counting the observations
they conducted while I shadowed them. The principal explained, ‘I’m probably not
allowed to do a rated observation with you in the room. . .I don’t want to open myself
up to being grieved.’ The administration at GMS knew the potential consequences of
a grievance. They occasionally made reference to a dispute involving a former teacher
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who had contested her dismissal from GMS. The administrators had to go to the central
district oﬃce to testify for the case, which had been ongoing for several months. At the
end of the year, the administration developed a schedule to diﬀerentiate instruction
better for ELs in the next school year, but this plan was never put into practice because,
according to one administrator, it violated the teachers’ contract: ‘I came up with this
really complicated genius program, [but the teachers did not like it], there were ELA
teachers with six diﬀerent groups and contractually that is not allowed.’ Upholding but
not overstepping the contract took precedence in a process that would ideally be driven
by the goals of supporting and improving teaching and learning.
The administration also invoked the contract to direct teacher behaviors and to
justify their authority to do so. During staﬀ orientation before the school year began,
GMS’s leadership dedicated several hours to review the district’s regulations around
everything from lesson plans to bathroom passes. Teachers’ instructional obligations
were given equal attention to all other legally mandated guidelines, such as which kinds
of cleaning products educators could independently use in their classrooms. GMS’s
administration distilled a list of approximately forty regulations on a document that
teachers were required to review at home and sign to conﬁrm that they acknowledged
that they would be held accountable if they acted out of compliance. One teacher
reported to me that she thought the beginning of the school year was particularly
‘disorganized’ because the new contract had reduced due process requirements and had
made it easier for the administration to dismiss teachers: ‘there were some teachers here
the ﬁrst week who have disappeared, the contract has changed due process so that
issues with teachers are dealt with more quickly.’ According to this teacher, some
teachers had been excessed in the ﬁrst week, which meant that everyone’s teaching
assignments had been shifting around the ﬁrst month of the school year.
Teachers referenced the contract less frequently than administrators. When they did,
it was typically evoked to make sense of their rights and entitlements. One teacher
explained that the new agreement meant that the teachers would be back-paid for the
years in which they were working out of contract. The teacher who served as the union
representative led the way at GMS in redeﬁning teacher issues as potential breaches of
the agreement. One day, when she discussed with another teacher how to ﬁnd resources
for instruction, she noted that the contract required the state and district to provide
lesson plan support for the common core learning standards in ELA and math and that,
because they failed to provide this support, no teacher ratings should be negative:
‘you’re not going to get anything from the district. . .which is why they shouldn’t give
any ELA teachers [a rating of] “ineﬀective” because they don’t have [any resources] up
online.’ In one staﬀ meeting, she pressed the administration as to whether teachers
would get a negative note in their ﬁle if they brought in cleaning wipes to use in their
classrooms because the contract forbid substances unapproved by the maintenance staﬀ
to enter the building. She advocated for the rest of the teaching staﬀ in clarifying
teacher responsibilities and defending teacher rights, and, of all teachers, she most
frequently invoked the contract in negotiating interactions with administrators.
Linking teacher practice to a rubric
In addition to student growth measures, the detailed operationalization of eﬀective
instruction through an evaluative rubric sought to precisely measure teacher quality.
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Similar to the use of the contract at GMS, the rubric created to assess instructional
practice was invoked by teachers and administrators to negotiate interactions and to
compel particular behaviors. Utilized as a mediating device, the rubric created distance
between administrators and teachers. The administrators made use of the rubric
liberally, applying it to interactions with teachers that were only peripherally related
to evaluation. In this way, the rubric gained broad power and reproduced the corrosive
culture entailed by teacher accountability policy throughout the day.
Administrators employed the rubric to mediate interactions, which allowed them to
be less explicit about exercising their authority over teachers. In one instance, administrators brainstormed about how to phrase a letter to some teachers that required them
to attend a workshop on classroom management. Anticipating the sensitivity of singling
out particular teachers, especially veteran teachers, for support, they decided to draw
upon the language in the teacher evaluation rubric: ‘you are growing in the area of [36b
on the rubric], this is an opportunity for you to work on your management that we
have provided for you.’ They leveraged the rubric to issue directives indirectly, disconnecting them from teachers rather than opening lines of communication necessary
for eﬀective instructional supervision (Reddy et al. 2018).
The administration was especially prone to utilizing the rubric in interactions that
were tense, such as when they gave constructive or critical feedback. The principal
explained that he had internalized the rubric and no longer needed it in front of him
when writing his post-observation reports, however he brought the rubric with him to
post-observation meetings with teachers to facilitate giving face-to-face feedback: ‘I can
go and give feedback without the rubric, although it is helpful to have the rubric. . .
especially if what you are going to be saying is not going to be reinforcing all the
positives.’ The administration hoped that the rubric helped teachers to not take
personal interactions personally. Although they sought to avoid potentially negative
interactions with teachers, the administrators did not consider how using the rubric as
a crutch undermined this goal, since the distance it created eroded professional
relationships at GMS.
The rubric simpliﬁed the content discussed and vocabulary used in pre- and postobservation conferences between administrators and teachers. The conversations were
typically limited to rubric categories and subcategories. Teachers defended their practice and administrators oﬀered feedback through the rubric’s terminology. Both parties
seemed to ﬁnd predictability and thereby safety by constraining their dialogue within
the boundaries of the rubric. Using the rubric as a mediating device to avoid confrontation was given priority over deep reﬂection about and support of instructional
practice.
The administration also employed the rubric as a tool to compel teachers’ compliance with their directives in contexts indirectly related to evaluation. One assistant
principal asked the teachers on the EL committee she supervised to create binders to
document their work for accountability purposes, linking their participation to aspects
of the rubric. She suggested that another assistant principal take up the practice for his
committee of teachers working on school climate: ‘Why don’t you give them a binder. . .
explain this is for evidence of your professional work. . .you can use it for [their] rating
[too]. . ..it goes under “professional responsibility” for [the teacher rubric].’ In another
administrative meeting, she suggested that the other administrators adopt her practice
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of requiring teachers to hand in a log of parent outreach every semester to hold them
accountable for contacting families during the time designated for this purpose each
week. The principal then proposed that the log should be collected each month.
Another administrator suggested that the internet-based program GMS used to contact
parents should also be employed to monitor teachers, showing how the administration
transformed a tool for instruction and parent engagement into an instrument for
surveillance and evaluation. Implied in their eﬀorts was the idea that the increased
pressure that came with linking a task to the formal evaluation system would either
motivate or compel teachers to comply. Research on teacher motivation, however, has
shown that external pressures and incentives are less eﬀective than connecting to
a teacher’s sense of professional purpose (Nieto 2003). At a staﬀ meeting, one teacher
indirectly commented on the ever-expanding realm of tasks that were measured and
monitored by joking that the principal should rate the maintenance staﬀ with the
teacher rubric after they did not paint the classrooms as requested. Strategically adopting the rubric to further local priorities, the administration’s ‘school-based policy
elaboration’ was central to incorporating the policy into GMS’s culture (Braun,
Maguire, and Ball 2010), allowing distance to inﬁltrate teacher-administrator interactions throughout the school day.

Discussion and implications
Teacher evaluation systems that purport to precisely measure a teacher’s quality and
impact on student learning warrant concern beyond the validity and reliability of their
methodologies. By documenting the day-to-day enactment of teacher accountability at
GMS, I show how the joint tasks entailed by policy structured interactions in ways that
eroded the professional culture. Sharing student test scores and proctoring and grading
for colleagues’ students fostered vulnerability and anxiety in teacher-teacher relationships. Administrators’ relationships with teachers were made juridical, technical, and
distant as they liberally utilized the contract and the rubric to mediate interactions and
to issue directives.
This paper contributes an empirical examination of projections regarding the impact
of teacher evaluation reforms on professional culture; a more comprehensive understanding of the opportunities and costs in attempting to precisely measure teacher
quality as a means to ensure students receive an adequate education; and an opportunity to identify, and thereby interrupt, the joint tasks required by teacher evaluation
that are particularly corrosive to professional culture.
Contributions to the literature
The case of GMS suggests that research on the consequences of neoliberal reforms to
teacher evaluation needs to be broadened. It is important to pay attention to the role of
teachers and administrators in the implementation of teacher evaluation policies, to
examine both how possibilities for action and interaction are structured by policy and
how actors uniquely negotiate the spaces that they are given.
The current literature on implementation, which relies on theory or self-report,
envisages that teacher accountability increases individualism, anxiety, and litigiousness
among school professionals. My ﬁndings at GMS conﬁrm some of these prognoses,
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disconﬁrm others, and illuminate mechanisms that link policy and professional culture.
Within the joint tasks required for evaluation, teachers at GMS did not become more
individualistic or competitive. In fact, teachers were made more interdependent and
had to coordinate to accomplish several steps of the process that led to their ratings.
Coordination did not always entail collaboration, or working together with trust to
support student learning and professional growth. The weekly time set aside for teacher
collaboration was often consumed with the joint tasks of norming and grading exams,
leaving less time for planning together, sharing resources, or providing each other with
feedback. The time dedicated to enacting teacher accountability may help explain why
these reforms accompany decreased teacher collaboration. My ﬁndings at GMS did
conﬁrm that neoliberal evaluation policies increase anxiety for teachers and suggest
several possible sites that may generate these feelings. Teachers’ reliance on their
colleagues’ instruction, proctoring, and grading for their student growth measures
and administrators’ use of evaluation rubrics and the contract to ensure compliance
in all realms of a teacher’s day may lower staﬀ morale. Although I found no evidence of
active lawsuits brought by the community or employees relevant to teacher accountability, I did witness how understandings of the contract that regulated teacher evaluation shaped administrator and teacher interactions and served to deﬁne behaviors
through a juridical lens.
Prioritizing professional culture
Teacher evaluation has a twofold mission: to ensure instructional quality and to support
professional growth. Recent reforms to teacher evaluation have thrown these two
priorities oﬀ balance. No matter how much policymakers and administrators frame
teacher evaluation as being a developmental tool, teachers experience it as surveillance
and constant measurement. Warren and Ward explain: ‘teachers feel the pressures of
accountability, and experience a disconnect between the promise of the policy and what
it actually delivers’ (2018, 15). How can we reclaim teacher evaluation so that it
supports teachers? Below, I consider how the case of GMS suggests we can mitigate
the negative impact of teacher evaluation on professional culture, which is integral for
professional growth (Kraft and Papay 2014).
Implications for policymakers
Educational policy within the accountability movement has not adequately attended to
school climate (Cohen et al. 2009). With the greater ﬂexibility aﬀorded states under
ESSA (Amrein-Beardsely and Holloway 2017; Sawchuk 2016) and a turn away from
teacher accountability by large foundations (Loewus 2017), policymakers have the
opportunity to rethink teacher evaluation systems and to roll-back aspects that undermine professional culture. Eﬀorts by policymakers to respond to recent research by
improving the reliability and validity of measures of teacher quality are shortsighted
because they do not consider the broader impact of these policies. In fact, such eﬀorts
would only reinforce norms of interaction that undermine a positive professional
culture, which supports teacher retention and student achievement. The impact on
professional culture is one more reason that policymakers should be wary of VAMs and
rubrics that attempt to quantify teacher quality. Lawmakers should avoid policies that
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require teachers to expend large portions of their collegial time preparing students for,
administering, and grading tests. Teachers should not be asked to work on aspects of
teacher evaluation that are purely for accountability and do not contribute to their
professional development. Moreover, accountability should shift toward holding districts and states responsible for the equitable distribution of quality educators and away
from judging individual teachers, which has questionable validity and erodes professional culture. Considering teacher shortages and high rates of teacher turn-over,
policymakers need to be more attentive to professional culture.
Implications for teachers and school administrators
Through joint tasks, teacher evaluation policy constructed policy subjects at GMS whose
interactions were strained and distanced. The character of these relationships can reify
over time such that teachers and administrators behave in ways that facilitate neoliberal
reforms. Indeed, Holloway and Brass (2017) found that teachers in the US have become
invested in the ways that market-based education reforms deﬁne their role and their value
as educators, in contrast to the advent of accountability policies in the early 2000s which
met extensive teacher resistance. However, the construction of policy subjects is not total
(Ball et al. 2011). Individuals are granted ‘embedded agency’ within the range of possible
action allowed by the policy environment: ‘while institutions constrain action they also
provide sources of agency and change’ (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, 101). Teachers and
administrators are also policy actors (Ball et al. 2011). The market-based logic of neoliberal
teacher evaluation policies is one of several institutional logics available to teachers and
administrators for making sense of their professional roles and their possibilities for
action: ‘The contradictions inherent in the diﬀerentiated set of institutional logics provide
individuals, groups, and organizations with cultural resources for transforming individual
identities, organizations, and society’ (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, 101). I oﬀer school
actors two approaches to countering a market-based logic and to mitigating teacher
accountability’s corrosive impact on professional culture: segmenting logics and fostering
communities of connection.
Segmenting logics to contain the inﬂuence of teacher accountability. Goodrick and
Reay proﬀer that multiple logics can coexist ‘by segmenting their impact’ (2011, 379). At
any given time, all institutional logics are arranged in a particular constellation, with some
more dominant than others (Goodrick and Reay 2011). At GMS, the neoliberal, market
logic of teacher accountability was dominant in multiple sites across the working day.
Alternative logics, such as a professional logic that values the expertise and judgement of
teachers, were present but subordinate. Even though professional and market logics may
be in competition with each other, they can coexist if they are made dominant in diﬀerent
aspects of work (Goodrick and Reay 2011). School leaders who seek to support professional growth and student learning should compartmentalize teacher accountability policy
within their schools and take steps to contain its impact, such as limiting their use of the
contract and evaluative rubric to compel teacher compliance. Administrators have disproportionate inﬂuence over the structure of professional interactions in schools and can
play a large role in ‘re-imagining the teacher as an intellectual, rather than as a technician
or as a bundle of skills and competencies’ (Ball 2016, 1056). Shaped by multiple often
contradictory logics, actors already shift between logics throughout their day
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unconsciously (Ball et al. 2011). School administrators and teachers can apply an understanding of their malleability to switch between logics with intention.
Forging communities of connection. Interactions construct policy subjects and are
necessary to deconstruct them. Identity is shifting and relational, such that new
modes of interaction over time can create new subjectivities (Rodgers and Scott
2008). Seemingly mundane interactions in schools can cumulatively shape and reshape
organizational norms (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984). In this way, teachers and administrators can resist the corrosive impact of teacher accountability by the simple act of
connecting. Everyday eﬀorts to humanize one’s colleagues is a form of radical opposition to the professional distance and strain that support neoliberal education policies.
Agency to resist teacher accountability cannot be attained individually. A reform of
teacher and administrator identities relies on a community of practice that fosters
connection: ‘[a]s a locus of engagement in action, interpersonal relations, shared
knowledge, and negotiation of enterprises. . .communities hold the key to real transformation’ (Wenger 1998, 85). Teachers and administrators can transform their schools by
interacting in ways characterized by support, connection, and mutual professional
respect. Finding connection in professional interactions is a mechanism of policy
reform from the ground up.
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